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Politics
The Middle East is the prime example of Murphy's Law: "If
things can get worse, they will." It is also the most dangerous area
of the world in terms of superpower relations, because allegiances and
influence are so fluid, instability so endemic, and superpower interests
so great.
The Middle East's intractability and instability have recently
been demonstrated by the Soviet-Afghan and Iraqi-Iranian wars, the U.S.-
Libyan crisis, the assassination of Sadat, the failure of the Saudi
eight-point peace program at the abortive Fez Arab summit, and the
recent unparalleled height of U.S.-Israeli tension. The mid-1981 cease-
fire in the Lebanon seems increasingly precarious, endangered by the
This essay is primarily based on travels in Israel, Egypt, Saludi
Arabia, Bahrein, Pakistan, and Jordan in August 1981. I am grateful
to The Reader's Digest, of which I am a roving editor, and to its
editor-in-chief, Edward T. Thompson, which sponsored the trip. For
general surveys, see Roberto Aliboni (director of the Italian Instituto
Affari Internazionali-IAI) , "Sicherheitsprobleme im Nahen und Mittleren
Osten--von innen gesehen," Europa Archiv, Oct. 10, 1981 (a condensed
version of the original in Lo Spettatore Internazionale, vol. 16, no.
3, 1981); A.H. [Arnold Hottinger], "Polarisierung der arabischen Welt?,"
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, Sept. 27/28, 1981 and "Die Zukunftsprobleme der
Araber," ibid., Oct. 16, 1981; The Economist, Dec. 26, 1981, pp. 51-59;
George S. Wise and Charles Issawi, Middle East Perspectives: The Next
Twenty Years (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1981). For the Gulf, see
"Defending the Gulf," The Economist, June 6, 1981 and Hossein Amiersadeghi,
ed., The Security of the Persian Gulf (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1981.)
I
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renewed PLO artillery buildup on the Lebanese-Israeli border. Iran
after Khumayni is threatened by civil war and possibly even by superpower
intervention. And one watershed is close indeed: will Israel evacuate the
rest of the Sinai before April 26, 1982, and what will Egypt do
thereafter?
The most immediate, but probably temporary good news in January
1982 was that the mid-1981 Lebanese cease-fire, imposed on Israel by
the United States and bought from the PLO by Sa(TdT Arabia, and the
first even indirect Israeli-PLO agreement, was still holding. The second one
was that Mubarek seemed to be consolidating his position in Egypt. The
third, and perhaps the most important, was that it seemed likely that
the Israelis would evacuate the rest of the Sinai and that a Sinai interna-
tional peace-keeping force would be deployed, for the first time,
with an American at the head and without United Nations involvement,
and that it would have West European participation.
Even so, 1981 thus showed again how intractable the Arab-Israeli pro-
blen is, and how it still dominates the foreign policies of the antagonists.
(The new American Administration's belief that it could organize an
Arab-Israeli anti-Soviet "strategic consensus" was soon shown to be an
illusion.)
* * *.* ** * *** ****
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The mid-1981 cease-fire in the Lebanon2 where popular sentiment
for a restoration of genuine independence, especially vis- -vis Syria,
was growing, was imposed on Israel by the United States and bought
from the PLO by Sa'udi Arabia. It was the first time that Israel had even
indirectly negotiated and agreed with the PLO on anything.
Syria continues troubled by Sunni terrorism against Hafiz al-Asad's
minority Alawite regime. It has moved closer to the Soviet Union roughly
parallel to, and related with, Iraq's move away from it. Asad's missiles
in Zahle (in the Lebanese Beka'a valley on the Beirut-Damascus road),
have still not been removed, despite U.S. Ambassador Habib's efforts,
and Syria still may become involved when, as is likely, the Lebanese
cease-fire breaks down. (Indeed, one possible scenario thereafter would
be an Israeli strike on Syria.) Finally, recently tension has developed
between Syria and Arafat, due to the latter's natural desire not to
be so dependent on the former.3
2Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard
Center for International Affairs, 1980); A.H. [Arnold Hottinger] from BeirutK
"Umschichtung in Libanon," Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, Oct. 7, 1981; William
W. Haddad, "Divided Lebanon," Current History, Jan. 1982.
3 The essential recent article on Syrian politics is Hanna Batatu, "Some
Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling Military Group and the
Causes for its Dominance," Middle East Journal, Summer 1981. Prof. Batatu
is working on a book on Syrian politics, which bids fair to become as
definitive as his The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements
of Iraq (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton, 1978.) See also Itamar Rabinovitch,
"Full Circle -- Syrian Politics in the 1970s" in Wise and Issawi, Middle
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Jordan continues prosperous and stable. It has become the
closest Arab ally of Iraq and serves as its rear area for transportation
and air flights, now that Basra is unusable.4 Washington's continued
pursuit of the Camp David process, its initial incorrect assumption
that Jordan could be brought to join it, and its toleration of Begin's
occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem led to a serious deteriora-
tion in Jordan's relations with the United States. King Husayn's Novem-
ber visit to Washington seemed to improve them somewhat again.5
Sa 'i Arabia also seems somewhat less unstable than a year ago
and certainly more active in regional politics. It has in part over-
come the shock of the 1979 Mecca rebellion, and its intelligence
service is not so likely to be caught by surprise again. The 3000-
strong royal family is more like a one-party system than a typical
monarchy. Yet corruption continues to flourish and the continuing ban
on political activity is bound to increase discontent, especially among
western-educated youth. There may be one or more attempted coups in
the next years. However, the country's size, its carefully built-in
checks and balances between the army and the national guard, its lack
of one capital city, and the great size of its royal family make a
Eastern Perspectives, op. cit.; David Ottaway from Damascus, "Syria's
Assad- Gets Upper Hand," The Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1981;and Adeed
Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1980.)
4
Le Monde, Sept. 23, 1981, p. 3.
5The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 4, 1981, p. 6. See in general
Aliboni, op. cit.; Adam Garfinkle, "Jordan and Arab Polarization,"
Current History, Jan. 1982.
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successful coup unlikely in the near future.
SatudT Arabia's more active foreign policy6 has occurred be-
cause enough time has passed for its leaders to recover from the
Mecca incident and because the other Arab states were inactive. Without
Sa t~dT help the cease-fire in the Lebanon would not have occurred. The
Satld!-led Gulf Cooperation Council, taking advantage of Iran's and
Iraq's near-paralysis in foreign policy, is consolidating conservative
Arab control of the Gulf and improving its security. The Sadis
have used the Islamic Council, which they control, to condemn the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. In October 1981 they successfully imposed one
price ($34) on OPEC and agreed as a consequence to lower their production
to 8.5 mbd. Sa~di Crown Prince Fahd's recent eight-point Middle
Eastern settlement plan, which for the first time implicitly recognized
Israel's right to exist, crashed primarily because of Syrian opposition
at the Fez Arab summit. Even so, it marked a significant SatudT ini-
tiative and might well be renewed later. Pakistan seems likely to
station an army unit in Saludi Arabia as an unacknowledged pretorian
guard for the Sa uIdi royal family.
Sa4Edi Arabia needs and wants U.S. support for its security.
But it believes that the unsolved Palestinian question also menaces its
61 have profited from a seminar by M. Jean Fransois-Poncet at the Harvard
Center for European Studies on Nov. 4, 1981.
7The best analysis is by A.H. [Arnold Hottinger] in the Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,
Aug. 11, 1981, p. 1.
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security. Kuweit and the Gulf Sheikhdoms, where many more Palestinians
live than in Sal'dI Arabia, believe the same. KhumaynT seems to have
discredited his revolution among some of their Shia, of which there are
many, especially in Bahrein. Moreover, there is more Pakistani mili-
tary personnel in some of the Sheikhdoms, relatively, than in Sa(iid!
Arabia. Finally, the Dhufar rebellion remains quiet in Oman. Yet
the causes of Islamic fundamentalism exist in the Gulf as in Sa ldi
Arabia, and the British presence in Oman remains overwhelming.8 More-
over, South Yemen, aided by Libya and the Soviet Union, is actively
supporting the North Yemeni National Democratic Front in its guerrilla
war in the south of North Yemen.9 The recent treaty among South Yemen,
Libya and Ethiopia, undoubtedly with Soviet blessing, indicated that
such activity might well be stepped up in the future.
The fundamental cause of Sa'GdI strains with Washington is the
Sa adT distrust of American leadership. Reagan's AWACS victory will
prevent Satudi-American relations from worsening, but only progress on
the Palestinian question will improve them decisively.10
8 Conversations in Bahrein, August 1981; Adelbert Weinstein from Salalah,
"Oman kann hart zuschlagen, wenn es angegriffen wird," Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 27, 1981, and for excellent background, Navil
M. Kaylani, "Politics and Religion in Umlin: A Historical Overview,"
Journal of International Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 10, 1979, pp.
567-579. See also Mark Mallock Brown from Oman in The Economist,
Aug. 11, 1979, p. 11.
9See James Adams in Sana'a in the London Sundayj Times, Sept. 6, 1981,
summarized in the Boston Sunday Globe, Sept. 13, 1981, p. 23.
10For background on Saludi Arabia, see Arnold Hottinger, "Does Saudi
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Turkey's military regime has overcome the terrorism which threatened
to tear the country apart and destroy AtatUrk's pro-western, secularist
heritage, of which the Turkish military have been the historic guardians.
The military takeover in Turkey, although not democratic, is thus
stabilizing and pro-western, and a timetable has been announced for
return to democratic rule.
In Afghanistan the Soviets have settled down to a long war, with
no end in sight. The insurgents are more numerous and active than
in 1980 and are reportedly receiving arms from abroad. The Soviets
control little more than the major cities and the major roads only
by day; the rebels dominate most of the rest of the country.12
Arabia Face Revolution?," The New York Review of Books, June 28, 1979
and an important series of -articles from Riyadh in the Neue ZUrcher
Zeitung, June 12, 14, and 21, 1979 ; William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia
in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings, 1981); and Bruce R. Kuniholm, "What the Soviets Really
Want: A Primer for the Reagan Administration," Orbis, Spring 1981.
1 1See Andreas KohlschUtter from Ankara, "'Noch sind die Menschen der
Armee dankbar,"' Die Zeit, July 31, 1981; Arnold Hottinger, "Ohne
AtatUrk gabe es keine Turkei," ibid., May 22, 1981; Paul B. Henze,
"The Long Effort to Destabilize Turkey," The Wall Street Journal, Oct.
7, 1981; "How sick a man?," The Economist, Sept. 21, 1981; James
Brown, "Turkey's Policy in Flux," Current History, Jan. 1982.
1 2The best recent analysis (from Peshawar) is "Russia in Afghanistan,"
The Economist, May 23, 1981. See also Richard S. Newell, "Interna-
tional Responses to the Afghanistan Crisis," The World Today, May
1981; my "Super-power Relations after Afghanistan," Survival, July/
Aug. 1980 and Zalmay Khalilzad, "Afghanistan and the Crisis in Ameri-
can Foreign Policy," ibid.; Carl Bernstein, "Arms for Afghanistan,"
The New Republic, July 18, 1981.
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Pakistan's General Zia is less unpopular than in 1980. The
economic situation is better, because of two good monsoons and the $2
billion yearly remittances from Pakistanis working in the Gulf. The
opposition has been discredited by the stay in Kabul of the two sons
of its former leader,' Bhutto, and their association with the hijacking
of a Pakistani airplane, during which a Pakistani diplomat was killed.
The intermittently rebellious tribes in Baluchistan remain quiet,
and the Soviet invasion of, and preoccupation with, Afghanistan make
unlikely a revival soon of the Baluch tribal insurgency of the early
1970s. The arrival of the Soviet army on Pakistan's Afghan border has
also strengthened Zia's position. So has Washington's military and econo-
mic aid. Pakistan, like Prussia, is an army which possesses a state.
Its army may change generals, but it is unlikely soon to surrender
control of its state.13
The other peripheral areas of the Middle East seem no less stable,
and some more so, than last year. In Algeria, President Chadli
1 3For Pakistan, see several articles in The Economist, Oct. 31, 1981,
including one by one of Bhutto's associates. See also Erwin H~ckel,
"Kernenergie und Kernwaffenverbreitung: der Fall Pakistan," Europa
Archiv, May 25, 1981. I differ with Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's
Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (Washington, D.C.:
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981.) I think the
danger of renewed Baluch insurgency in the near future, and of actual
Soviet intervention, overt or covert, less than he does. This having
been said, however, the book is a mine of information and essential
reading for any student of Pakistani and Baluch politics. It is
especially valuable for its interviews with Baluch leaders and for chap.
6 on Iranian Baluchistan. I have also profited from Richard Frye,
"Attitudes of Baluch Intellectuals," (unpub. MS.)
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Benjedid has consolidated his power and moved further toward technocracy.
Morocco's agreement to a plebiscite in the Western Sahara may fore-
shadow a compromise between it and the Libyan- and Algerian-supported
Polisario guerrilla movement, which has, however, recently had some
military successes.' Mengistu's Ethiopia is still tied down by the
Eritrean rebellion but finds Moscow and Havana increasingly irrelevant
to its nationalist and development objectives. Nor has Mengistu's
signing a cooperation agreement with South Yemen and Libya led to a
worsening of his improved relations with the Sudan, which in turn has
restricted the activities of the Eritrean rebels in its territory.
Somalia remains quiet. 1 5
In Israel,16 the reelection of Begin marked the victory, at
1 4Robert Mortimer, "Algeria's New Sultan," Current History, Dec.
1981; Philippe Rondot, "Der Maghreb im Wandel," Europa Archiv, Nov.
25, 1981. Paul Balta from Rabat, "Le Maroc face aux 6cheances," Le
Monde, Sept. 22, 1981 et seq.; Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff,
The Western Saharans (N.Y.: Barnes and Noble, 1980); William H. Lewis,
"Western Sahara: Compromise or Conflict?," Current History, Dec. 1981;
"Polisario Gains Worry Hassan," The Observer (London), Dec. 14, 1981,
p. 14; A.H. [Arnold Hottinger], "Die Spannung zwischen dem Sudan und
Libyen," Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, Oct. 8, 1981; and especially dispatches
from the Polisario- and Moroccan-occupied parts in Le Monde, Dec. 17,
1981, p. 7.
15
Paul B. Henze, "Communism and Ethiopia," Problems of Communism,
May-June 1981; Udo Steinbach, "Spannungsherd Horn von Afrika. Ansltze
zu einem neuen Pragmatismus in der Region," Europa Archiv, Apr. 25,
1981; Philippe Decraene from Mogadiscio, "Bruits de bottes en Somalie,"
Le Monde, August 5, 6, 1980.
1 6Bernard Avishai, "The Victory of the New Israel," The New York Review
of Books, Aug. 13, 1981; Harold M. Waller, "Israel's Foreign Policy
-10-
least for some time to come, of a coalition of the chauvinist minority
of the (European) Ashkenazi elite and the majority of (Oriental)
Sephardi masses, who make up 60 percent of all Israelis. Two-
thirds of the Sephardim voted for Begin and two-thirds of the
Ashkenazim for his Alignment opponent Peres. The Sephardim are so
pro-Begin because they have been discriminated against by the
Labor Zionist Ashkenazi elite; they hate and fear the Arabs, from
whose lands they came; and their religiosity is attracted by Begin's.
Begin's vote was inversely proportional to newspaper readership
and university education, but Israeli youth, including Ashkenazi
ones, supported him the most strongly of all age groups. Begin's
narrow victory made him make major new concessions to the chauvinist
religious extremists. The Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor,
overwhelmingly popular in Israel, staked out Israel's claim to
regional nuclear monopoly and will drive the Arabs even more to challenge
it. However, the bloody Israeli air-raid on Beirut, much less
popular in Israel, hurt Israeli-U.S. relations because U.S. television
coverage of its results helped lead to Reagan's compelling Begin
to accept the Lebanese cease-fire.
Begin has stepped up Israel's creeping annexationism on the
West Bank. He is expanding the Israeli settlements there and
Challenge," Current History, Jan. 1982. For a first-hand American
account of Israeli policy on the West Bank, see "Iron Fist on the
West Bank," Newsweek, Aug. 24, 1981.
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setting up "village councils" of Arab collaborators to compete with
the pro-PLO elected mayors, and he has cut off development aid
to the West Bank and Gaza from the Arab states.
Palestinian national consciousness, within and without the
West Bank and Gaza, is increasing. The PLO's political victories
and rising prestige, and those of the whole Arab world, plus the in-
creasing isolation of Israel, increased PLO support among Palestinians,
and -the historically predictable cycle of repression, resistance,
more repression, and more resistance, which has characterized the
West Bank and Gaza,have increased it still further. The Israeli
occupation has not been so severe, as occupations go, but it seems
18
gradually to be becoming more so.
Begin argues that the PLO is terrorist and a Soviet instru-
ment and that a Palestinian state on the West Bank would therefore
be a Soviet satellite. But other guerrilla fighters for independence,
17 See the revealing report by Shipler from Hebron in The New York
Times, Jan. 10, 1982, p. 4E.
1 8My conclusions in these respects are primarily based upon yearly
visits to the West Bank for the last decade. See also Ahmad J.
Dhaher, "Changing Cultural Perspectives of the Palestinians,"
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Spring 1981; Avi
Plascov, "A Homeland for the Palestinians?," Survival, Jan./Feb.
1978 and especially Ann Moseley Lesch, Political Perceptions of the
Palestinians on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Washington, D.C.:
Middle East Institute Special Study, no. 3, 1980). I have also profited
from seminars on the West Bank Palestinians by Dr. Huhammad Hallaj
and Prof. Ian Lustick at Harvard on Nov. 12 and 19, respectively.
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Algeriansand Africans, have also used terrorist tactics, and during
the Israeli independence struggle Begin himself was one of the most
successful terrorist leaders of modern times. The PLO buys weapons
from Moscow, for it cannot get them elsewhere, but few of its members
are Marxist-Leninists. Its money comes from the conservative Arab
oil states. A Palestinian state would be financially dependent upon
them, hemmed in by Israel and Jordan, and thus unlikely to become
pro-Soviet. If Arafat and his Fatah majority of the PLO were to
agree to a settlement which would include recognition of Israel within
its 1967 boundaries, the PLO's radical minority would probably split
off, but they would hardly be able to wreck the settlement.
The recent flare-up in the Lebanon reached its height because
for the first time, primarily through Libyan help, PLO artillery just
outside Israel made the Israeli border settlements unlivable.
(In one of them, Kiryat Shmona, 14 out of 17 thousand inhabitants
fled under PLO artillery fire.) When Israeli bombardment failed
to silence PLO fire, Begin ordered Beirut bombed.
The PLO won a political victory by Israel's acceptance of
its indirect participation in the Lebanese cease-fire. It is now
again building up its artillery in the southern Lebanon. Given the
short duration of previous Middle Eastern cease-fires, plus this
build-up, if the cease-fire is not rapidly extended and consolidated
-13-
it will probably collapse. Indeed, the Israelis, shaken by AWACs
victory and fearful thatReagan will go too far toward Fahd's 8-point
peace policy, hope to get some U.S. reassurance by hinting that
they might otherwise be forced again to invade the Lebanon to crush
the PLO's artillery build-up there.2 0
Not that the other Arabs like the Palestinians: they do not.
Many of them fear, with some reason, that they may radicalize the
region. The Gulf oil states subsidize the PLO primarily to avoid
this. But the Arabs fear the Israelis more, and more still after
the Israeli raids on Baghdad and Beirut. Moreover, the domeseai
legitimacy of many Arab elites, endangered by the revival of Islamic
fundamentalism, requires them to insist that Israel abandon unilateral
sovereignty over East Jerusalem, the site of the third holiest
shrine of Islam. This is especially true of the Satudi royal family,
the titular guardians of the two main Islamic holy places, Mecca
and Medina, and of thepre-Sa udiHashimite rulers of Mecca.
The story of recent developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict
begins with Crown Prince Fahd's August 1981 announcement of his 8-
19For an argument that this need not, and should not, occur and
that limited Israeli-Syrian cooperation is possible and desirable,
see Zvi Lanir, "Israel's Involvement in Lebanon: A Precedent for an
'Open' Game with Syria?," Tel Aviv University Center for Strategic
Studies, no. 10, Apr. 1981.
2 0 Karen Elliott House, "Fear that Cease-Fire in Lebanon May Fail
Grows in Washington," The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 18, 1981.
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point peace plan, in which point 7 spoke of the "right of states in
the region to live in peace" -- i.e., the de facto recognition
of the right of Israel to exist. (The Sa udis publicly back and fell
on this point, to placate the radical Arabs, but the Fez summit
demonstrated that this was its meaning.) Fahd's plan got little
publicity at first but in the autumn the Safidl launched a major
effort to get it adopted at the next Arab summit.
Begin was trying to implement the "strategic collaboration"
with the United States, agreed with Reagan in September 1981, and
also to ward off U.S. pressure on him in the Camp David negotiations.
(He later said, and Washington did not deny, that the U.S. was trying
to get him to allow the Arabs in East Jerusalem to vote in the
Palestinian autonomy plebiscite provided for in the Camp David
agreements.) He was also being pressured by his own right wing
not to evacuate all of the Sinai, and felt that the U.S. was trying
to get him to pull back to Israel's 1967 borders.
The Satudis, meanwhile, were meeting opposition to Fahd's
plan from the Rejection Front, including most of the PLO. Arafat
was waffling, trying to avoid the double threat that confronted him:
the loss of Sal udi subsidies or of his majority in the PLO executive.
While this was going on, the vote on the sale of the AWACs
to Saludi Arabia came up in the U.S. Senate. The Administration
reportedly -- and naively -- had thought, or at least hoped, that
Begin would lay off them on this issue in returr for the agreement
-15-
on the "strategic consensus." But by the week before the vote,
the pro-Israeli lobby in Congress (and the pro-Saudr one also)
were working hard to influence the Senate. In the end, Reagan won
by two votes. The net result was primarily that the initially strongly
pro-Israeli feelings- of Reagan's "California Mafia" were severely
eroded and Begin's distrust of Washington greatly increased.
The next event, at the end of November, was the Arab summit
at Fez. There Asad's opposition and Arafat's equivocation not only
resulted in its abrupt and unprecedented adjournment after Fahd with-
drew his plan. Those who rejoiced were, of course, Israel and the
Rejection Front; those who lost the most were Sa'Uir Arabia and
the United States. 2 1
The following week, on November 30, the American-Israeli
"memorandum of understanding" was signed by Secretary Weinberger
and Defense Minister Sharon in Washington. The agreement provided
for joint maneuvers, stockpiling, and little else, and it was strictly
limited, at American insistence, to "the threat to peace and security
of the region caused by the Soviet Union . . . " and "not directed
against any states within the region" (i.e. not against the Arabs.)
However, the signing of the agreement was a further blow to the
Sa udIs (and the Egyptians) and helped the Rejection Front.
The United States and Israel were also arguing about the parti-
cipation of four West European states, Great Britain, France, Italy,
2 1See the very revealing report by Rouleau from Fez in Le Monde,
Nov. 27, 1981.
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and the Netherlands, in the Sinai peace-keeping force. The United States
had wanted them to participate from the beginning, the more so be-
cause Australia seemed to be making it a condition for its parti-
cipation. So had Egypt. Israel,initially in favor of it in the
hope that it would tie the Europeans to the Camp David process,
reversed its position when the EEC ministers welcomed Fahd's 8-
point plan and- insisted that the Europeans must formally accept the
Palestinian autonomy provisions of the Camp David agreements.
Because the Europeans, fearing that otherwise the Arabs would turn
against them, had declared on November 23 that the solution of the
Palestinian problem must be based on the principle of self-determina-
tion for the Palestinians and with the participation of the PLO,
Begin declared that he would not accept European participation.
Finally, Secretary Haig, in discussions with Foreign Minister
Shamir in Washington compromised on a joint U.S.-Israeli declaration
of December 3 that neither shared the Europeans' views on this subject
or the EEC Declaration of Venice, which took the same position.22
Then, in mid-December, just after the declaration of martial
law in Poland, Begin suddenly pushed through the Knesset a law ex-
tending Israeli "law, administration, and justice" to the Golan
22.
Text: The New York Times, Dec. 4, 1981, p. 11; background: Cornu
from Jerusalem in Le Monde, Dec. 5, 1981; The Economist, Oct. 31,
1981, p. 62; Dominique Molsi, "L'Europe et le conflit israelo-arabe,"
Politique etrangere, Dec. 1980; Adam M. Garfinkle, "America and
Europe in the Middle East: A New Coordination?," Orbis, Fall 1981;
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Heights -- i.e. annexing it to Israel. The American reaction
was swift and sharp: suspension of the "memorandum of understanding,"
of an annual $200 million agreement for Israel to sell the U.S.
services for the Sixth Fleet, and of the use of U.S. AID funds to help
finance the Israeli defense industry. The U.S. also voted in favor
of a Security Council resolution condemning the annexation. However,
other U.S. military and budgetary aid was not cut back.
These measures triggered an unprecedented and extraordinary
denunciation of the United States by Begin. He said that this was
the third time that Israel had been "punished" by the United States
which, given its conduct in World War II and Vietnam, had no right
to condemn Israel's bombing of Beirut; he implied that the U.S.
had informed Israel that Iraq was "about to produce atomic bombs";
and he declared that he considered that the U.S. had cancelled the
'memorandum of understanding." He went on:
. . . What kind of talk is this, 'punishing Israel?'
Are we a vassal state of yours? Are we a banana republic?
Are we 14-year olds who, if we misbehave, we get our
wrists slapped?
And he concluded byeuspectingthe Administration of anti-Semitism:
Harvey Sicherman, "Politics of Dependence: Western Europe and the
Arab-Israeli Conflict," ibid., Winter 1980; Stephen J. Artner,
"The Middle East: A Chance for Europe?," International Affairs
(London), Summer 1980.
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* . . Now I understand all this effort in
the Senate to win a majority for the arms
deal with Saudi Arabia, accompanied by an ugly
anti-Semitic campaign. First we heard the
slogan 'Begin or Reagan,' and then it followed
that anyone who opposed the deal with Saudi
Arabia supported a foreign head of state and
was not loyal to the United States. . . .23
While the Administration's public reaction was remarkably
mild, in the hope that U.S.-Israeli relations could be improved, its
pro-Israeli sentiments were further greatly eroded.
Israel's dilemma was serious. On the one hand, it had to keep
the autonomy negotiations going, in which the United States was
a full participant, so that Washington and/or Cairo could not abandon
Camp David and take up the Saudi peace plan -- to which Reagan,
to Israel's fury, made several favorable references. On the other
hand, Begin did not intend to make any major substantive concessions
in the autonomy negotiations, for he was determined to annex the
West Bank and keep East Jerusalem. The second Israeli dilemma was
organically tied to the first: How could Jerusalem bring sufficient
pressure and persuasion to bear in Washington to prevent its position
deteriorating further without so antagonizing Washington, as it had
over the AWACs issue, that the attempt itself would worsen Israel's
23Quoted from The New York Times, Dec. 21, 1981, p. 20. See the ex-
cellent analysis by Shipler from Jerusalem in ibid., Dec. 27, 1981,
p. E3, and the speech by Foreign Minister Shamir in the Knesset,
Dec. 23, 1981.
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situation?
By November 1981 Begin-had accomplished what one would hardly
have thought possible: he had turned the most pro-Israeli admini-
stration which the United States had ever had into one at whose top
the resentment at Israeli pressure over the AWACs issue had become
so great that it moved even closer to Riyadh. It is difficult to
see how Begin could have worsened more effectively the feelings of
his unique and essential ally toward him and his policy.
Iran after Khumayni is unpredictable. There the first Islamic
theocratic revolution of our times, now based only on the lower and
lower-middle classes, is devouring its young, the Mojahedin-e khalq,24
and being killed by them. Khumayni's increasingly bloody course,
economic decline, political terror, and the inconclusive war with
Iraq have antagonized the professional middle class, the westernized,
liberal intelligentsia and the bazaar merchants. The Kurds are rebelling.
Azerbaijan is disaffected. When Khumayni goes, Iran may well
turn to military rule. Or it may fall apart. Moscow might then try,
although it probably will not, what it did in 1921 and 1941: to get
control of Iranian Azerbaijan. Would the United States then occupy
Se the more extensive treatment of them in part II, infra.
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the oil fields of southern Iran?2 5
The war between Iraq and Iran seems less likely than it did
earlier to endanger Gulf stability. Iran's loss of territory in it
25
Since my "The Revival of Islamic Fundamentalism: The Case of Iran,"
International Security, Summer 1979 (q.v., p. 137, ftn. 6), I have
found the following particularly illuminating on Iran: Cheryl
Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad, "Secularization, Industrialization, and
Khomeini's Islamic Republic," Political Science Quarterly, Summer
1979; W.R. Campbell and Djamchid Darvich, "Global Implications of
the Islamic Revolution for the Status Quo in the Persian Gulf,"
Journal of South Asian and Middle Easpern Studies, Fall 1981 (parti-
cularly for Khumayni's version of Sh,-a); Eric Rouleau,"Khomeini's
Iran," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1980 and his three series from Tehran
in Le Monde, June 13, 1979 et seq., Jan. 6, 1981 et seq., and July
22, 1981 et seq.; Vahe Petrossian, "Dilemmas of the Iranian Revo-
lution," The World Today, Jan. 1980; Arnold Ho.ttinger, "Die Krise
in Iran -- eine Folge des Geheimdienstregimes," Europa Archiv,
Jan. 25, 1979 and "Die neue Taktik der Mujahedin in Teheran," Neue
ZUrcher Zeitung, Sept. 23, 1981; L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "The Iranian
revolution," International Journal (Toronto), Summer 1979; Majid
Tehranian, "Iran: Communication, Alienation, Revolution,"Intermedia
(London), Mar. 1979; Andreas KohlschUtter, "Eine Sieg der islamischen
Eiferer," Die Zeit, June 26, 1981; and especially James A. Bill,
"The Politics of Extremism in Iran," Current History, Jan. 1982.
Several books and collective volumes have appeared which throw much
light on Iranian developments: Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics
in Contemporary Iran (Albany: SUNY, 1980); Elie Kedourie and Sylvia
G. Haim, eds., Toward a Modern Iran (London: Frank Cass, 1980) and
especially valuable for Mangol Bayat-Philipp, "Shi'ism in Contemporary
Iranian Politics: the Case of Ali Shari'ati"; Nikki R. Keddie,
Iran: Politics, Religion and Society (London: Frank Cass, 1980) and
"Iran: Change in Islam and Change," International Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies, vol. 11 (1980).
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and Khumayni's bloody terror foiled his attempts to subvert Arab
leaders. In late 1981, in contrast, an Iranian counter-offensive
made some gains. The war is likely to last so long; it has so
weakened Iran and Iraq;and the danger of itsspreading, despite the
recent Iranian air-raid on Kuweit's oil facilities, has so declined
that the Arab Gulf states can now breathe easier. But although
Iraq has made some minor territorial gains, it cannot use its Gulf
port of Basra, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (although not the
Iranian or, for that matter, the Iraqi)Army) has fought well.
Moreover, Saddam Husayn's ethnic and religious base is extremely
small. Thus if the war drags on for many years, his position, now
still firm, will be seriously endangered.2 6
In Libya, the recent U.S. shooting down of two Libyan air-
planes over the Mediterranean showed the limits of Qadhdhafi's power
2 6The above is largely based on a seminar given by Prof. Hanna
Batatu at Harvard University on Oct. 29, 1981. I am also grateful
to Prof. Batatu for many discussions on Iraq, Syria, and other Arab
countries. For analyses of the current military situation as seen
from the front, see Michel Bole-Richard from Hoveyzah (Iraqi-occupied
Iranian Khuzistan) in Le Monde, July 25, 1981, p. 4, and Jean Gueyras,
"L'Irak des grandes ambitions," ibid., Sept. 20, 21-22, 1979
and "Un an de guerre dans le golfe," ibid., Sept. 23, 1981; Bruce
Porter, "Soviet Arms and the Iraqi-Iranian Conflict," Radio Liberty
Research, RL 382/80, Oct. 16, 1980; Philippe Rondot, "L'I.rakL une
A %puissance regionale en devenir," Politigue etrangere, Sept. 1980
and "La guerre du Chatt al-Arab: Les raisons de l'Irak," ibid., Dec.
1980; Arthur Campbell Turner, "Iraq: Pragmatic Radicalism in the
Fertile Crescent," Current History, Jan. 1982; for recent Iranian
victories, The Economist, Dec. 19, 1981, pp. 42-43.
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but also pushed him toward the Soviet Union. The assassination
of Sadat, his principal enemy in the Middle East, overjoyed him.
Yet he remains, as he wants to be, an ally, not a satellite, of the
Soviet Union. Algeria continues to try to prevent him moving
closer to Moscow.2 7
He also suffered a defeat in Chad, which he had occupied since
the end of 1980. In October 1981 the man whom he had brought to
power there Goukouni Oueddei, tired of Libyan interference and
supported by Mitterand, ordered the Libyan troops out. They left,
to be replaced by a pan-African force, with arms and transport aid
from France.
While the fully story of this development belongs to European
and African rather than to Middle Eastern politics -- it demonstrated
Mitterand's decision to play a substantial anti-Libyan role
27The best analysis of Qadhdhafi's policies is Arnold Hottinger,
"Iexpansionnisme libyen: Machrek, Maghreb et Afrique noir,"
Politique etrangere, Mar. 1981. See also John K. Cooley, "The
Libyan Menace," Foreign Policy, Spring 1981; Eric Rouleau from
Tripoli, "Le colonel Kadhafi s'oriente vers une alliance avec
Moscou," Le Monde, Sept. 8, 1981; Allan Cowell from Tripoli,
"Qaddafi's Dream of an Islamic Empire Seems a Mirage," The New
York Times, Nov. 22, 1981; Conrad KUhlein, Die politischen Ideen
Mu'ammer al-Qaddafis (Ebenhausen/Isar: Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, SWP-AZ 2300, Aug. 1981); "Chad faces life without those
Libyans," The Economist, Nov. 14, 1981, pp. 37-44; an interview
with Qadhdhafr by Oriana Fallaci in The New York Times Magazine
Dec. 16, 1979; Ronald Bruce St. John, "Libya's Foreign
and Domestic Policies," Current History, Dec. 1981.
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in the continent and the desire of some African states, notably
Nigeria, to do the same -- it had considerable implications for the
Middle East. It marked a defeat for Libya and a victory for Egypt
and for the Sudan (which had been sheltering Goukouni Oueddel's chief
opponent, Hissene Habre, who has now cut back his guerrilla activities)
which thereafter could feel less menaced by Libya, and indirectly
for the United States, whose intense concentration on Libya seemed
exaggerated to many observers.28 However, violent student
demonstrations in the Sudan demonstrate again the potential instability
of Sudanese politics. The whole affair may well push Qadhdhaf i
again toward the Middle East.
In Egypt Sadat was able to carry through his revolution
in Egyptian foreign policy, beginning with his trip to Jerusalem,
not only because of his own vision and charisma but also because
of Egyptian size and military strength, because far more than any
other Arab state Egypt is a historic state and nation, and because
the other Arab states were so divided, inter alia on the Arab-
Israeli disputeand had no credible policy, either peace or war,
2 8See the regular coverage and analyses in Le Monde; an analysis
by Geoffrey Godsell in The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 3, 1981;
Rene Lemarchand, "Chad: The Roots of Chaos," Current History,
Dec. 1981; John 0. Voll, "Reconciliation in the Sudan," ibid.; and
A.H. [Arnold Hottinger] from Beirut, "Die Spannung zwischen dem
Sudan und Libyen," Neue Ztrcher -Zeitung, Oct. 8, 1981 and from Cairo
"Aeussere und-innere BedrAngnisse des Sudans," ibid., Oct.21, 1981 and
"Entspannungssignale zwischen Libyen und Sudan?," ibid., Oct. 23,
1981.
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with respect to it. 2 9 But Egypt's problems remain primarily
economic, and Sadat's "open door" policy (infitah) increased the
gap between rich and poor, his 1981 repression of almost all of the
oppositional intelligentsia alienated them,and the stagnation of the
Camp David process, eroded his support still further.
30
Reports from Cairo indicate that the plot by Islamic
extremists against President Sadat was considerably more extensive
than had originally been thought and that the riots shortly there-
after in Asyut were related to it. Several hundred officers and
enlisted men have been arrested, as well as more than a thousand
Muslim fundamentalists.
Mubarak has maintained Sadat's foreign policies and modified
his domestic ones. He has changed Sadat's domestic policies con-
siderably. He has pledged to decrease the gap between the rich and
the poor, while keeping the infitah basically in effect. He has
started trials for corruption against some important political figures.
After his initial wave of arrests following upon Sadat's assassina-
tion, he has released some of the Nasserist and even Muslim Brother-
hood leaders and he has made overtures to the various oppositional
groups. In sum, Mubarak seems to be correcting the abuses of Sadat's
29P.J. Vatikiotis, "Regional Politics," in Wise and Issawi, eds.,
Middle East Perspectives, op. cit., p. 35.
E.g., Olfat M. El Tohamy in The Christian Science Monitor, Oct.
29, 1981.
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domestic policies and Sadat's own massive arrests just before he
was assassinated, while keeping the basic thrust of Sadat's foreign
policy in effect.
However, he may well eventually become cautious vis-a-vis
Israel and try to move back somewhat toward the other Arab
states. He has already stopped criticism of Sa udi Arabia in the
Egyptian media. (Sadat reportedly often made more concessions than
his advisors had recommended to Jerusalem and Washington, and was
more overtly criticial of the other Arab states.)
He may eventually cut back somewhat on, although almost
surely not end, normalization with Israel; try more to influence
Washington to press Israel harder on the Palestinian issue; and try
to overcome Egypt's isolation in the Arab world by improving rela-
tions with the conservative Arab states, especially SalTudT Arabia.
His long-range aim will be to recapture Egyptian leadership of the
Arab world. Until April 1982, however, he will probably go very
slowly in these directions in order to give no reason, or even excuse,
to Israel not to evacuate the rest of the Sinai. And even thereafter
he is very unlikely to abandon peace with Israel or alliance with
the United States.
Soviet Middle Eastern policy since World War II quite naturally
has sought minimally to prevent or at least to limit the area of local,
regional, or extra-regional powers hostile to the Soviet Union and,
maximally, to bring it under its own. It has therefore sought to
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lower U.S. presence and influence, remove U.S. military bases, and
establish its own. It has believed that it can and will profit from
the radicalization and anti-westernism which modernization brings,
especially vis-a-vis modernization's principal representative, the
United States, and it has tried to make this profit irreversible.
More recently, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, its growing
military power, and the American debacle in Iran and inactivity in the
Horn and elsewhere have made the elites of the region perceive the
Soviet Union as more capable, more motivated, and more successfully
exploitative of its rising opportunities than in the past. Moreover,
even the moderate Arabs, except for Egypt and its allies, continue
to see the Soviet Union as a pro-Palestinian and therefore useful
balance to U.S. support of Israel, and some want to restrain its hostile
attitude toward them. For all these reasons, a tendency to be more
forthcoming to Soviet overtures for increased contacts has appeared,
notably in Kuweit and even in Saudi Arabia.
In sum, Soviet gains and American losses in the Middle East
show that despite significant losses itself, most of all in Egypt,
the Soviet Union has considerably more influence there than it did
in 1950. Moscow may well, depending on regional opportunities and
American policies, get more still. Certainly it will continue to
try to do so.
Moscow has been aiding QadhdhafTI in his ventures in Chad and
his support of the Polisario, and South Yemen in its support of the
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NDF guerrilla struggle in North Yemen. The Soviets have probably
been urging on Asad a policy which in any case he can do little else
but follow: somewhere between defiance of, and concessions to,
Israel. We do not know what the Soviet position has been on the
rising tension between Asad and Arafat, but Moscow has presumably
been urging both not to endorse Fahd's 8-point program, and Asad's
opposition to it certainly pleased the Soviets.31
Moscow's greatest opportunity, of course, would be if Iran
fell apart after Khumayni. Yet even if this were to occur -- and I
think it unlikely -- the Soviets would probably be cautious about
moving their forces into Azerbaijan, to say nothing of trying to
3 1The two most useful essays on this subject that I have seen
recently are Shahram Chubin, "Gains for Soviet Policy in the Middle
East," International Security, Spring 1982 and (for historical
background) Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Evolution of Soviet Strategy
in the Middle East," Orbis, Summer 1980. See also Rubinstein,
"The Soviet Presence in the Arab World," and O.M. Smolansky, "Soviet
Policy in Iran and Afghanistan," Current History, Oct. 1981; Karen
Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt (N.Y.: St. Martin's,
1979) and "Soviet Decision-Making in the Middle East: The 1973
October War and the 1980 Gulf War," International Affairs (London),
Winter 1980-1981; Rubinstein, "The USSR and Khomeini's Iran,"
ibid., Autumn 1981; Muriel Atkin, "The Kremlin and Khomeini," The
Washington Quarterly, Spring 1981 and a series of articles in Journal
of International Affairs, Fall/Winter 1980/1981: Karen Dawisha,
"Moscow Moves in the Direction of the Gulf -- So Near and Yet So
Far"; Robert H. Donaldson, "The Soviet Union in South Asia: A Friend
to Rely on?," Robert 0. Freedman, "Soviet Policy toward the Middle
East since the Invasion of Afghanistan"; Jiri Valenta, "Soviet-
Cuban Intervention in the Horn of Africa: Impact and Lessons."
See also Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and the PLO (N.Y.: Praeger,
1980.)
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march to the Persian Gulf. Until then, Moscow is likely to con-
tinue its present policy of having the Tudeh support Khumayni,
encourage Khumayni's anti-Americanism, and wait for better oppor-
tunities anon.
The Soviet situation in Afghanistan is no better, and quite
possibly worse, than it was in 1980. Yet it would be wrong to anti-
cipate that for that or any other reason Moscow will abandon its
attempt to subdue Afghanistan. My impression is that they mean to
fight it out if it takes all this decade. Moscow would of course
like to get Pakistan to close its border, diminish if not end its
relations with China and the United States, and become "Finlandized."
But this remains a dream, despite the tendency in the PPP and else-
where in Pakistan civilian society to try to improve relations with
the Soviet Union. President Zia and, presumably, the other military
leaders have chosen the other course. In late 1981, Moscow realistically
could only hope to continue to cause Pakistan to limit its tolera-
tion of aid to the Afghan rebels and its ties with the West.3 3
3 2Joshua Epstein, "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF
Deterrent," International Security, Fall 1981. For a balanced
appraisal of Soviet (and American) policies in the Middle East,
see Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Superpowers in the Arab World," The Washing-
ton quarterly, Summer 1981.
3 3David Willis from Islamabad, "Pakistan considers friendlier line
toward Moscow," The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 9, 1981; con-
versations in Moscow, December 1981; and William E. Griffith, "The
USSR and Pakistan," Problems of Communism, Jan.-Feb. 1982.
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II
Revolutionary Islamic Fundamentalism
Revolts against western-style34 modernization are not new,
nor are fundamentalist religious revivals, in Islam or elsewhere.
Usually, indeed, they are combined, as they were in the Taip'ing
rebellion in China, the Ahmadiya in India and Pakistan, the Madhist
movement in the Sudan, and the Babi movement in Iran. Nor do
such revolts reject all aspects of the West: usually western
technology is accepted but western morals and culture are rejected.
Even in Japan, which most westerners think the epitome of Asian
western-style modernization, the wounds of it remain,as one perceptive
Japanese recently noted:
What is a nativist? He is a man who sticks
to the perception of the world lost . . . . I have
never lived in Japan when Japan was the whole world
to the Japanese. But still I am sharing this
nativist's sorrow. . . .
And in the West itself, what was the New Left, and what are the
remaining flower children in urban and rural communes, the Hare
Krishnas, the Jesus freaks, if not those who try to recover the
sense of community which they have lost?
3 4As contrasted to Japanese- or Soviet-style.
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Nor is the current revival of Islamic fundamentalism3 5
the only one going on. Protestant fundamentalism is certainly
rising in the United States. But why, in Islam in general and the
Arab world in particular, does the religious revival so menace the
existing political structures? And why is a significant,albeit
I have found Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament (N.Y.: Cambridge,
1981) the most profound and V.S. Naipaul, Among the Believers (N.Y.:
Knopf, 1981) the best at conveying atmosphere, especially whenone adds to
it the review of it by Ajami in The New York Times Book Review, Oct.
24, 1981. The best country-by-country survey is Mohammed Ayoob,
The Politics of Islamic Reassertion (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1981.)
Fazlur Rahman, Islam (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966) is
basic. I have also drawn on three articles by Prof. Saad Eddin
Ibrahim of the American University in Cairo, "Anatomy of Egypt's
Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings,"
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Dec. 1980, pp. 423-
453; "An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and
Sadat," prepared for the First International Seminar on the Islamic
Alternative at the Institute of Arab Studies, Belmont, Mass., June
5-6, 1981; Nazih N.M. Ayubi, "The Political Revival of Islam: The
Case of Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Dec.
1980; and A.H. [Arnold Hottinger], "Macht und Ohnmacht der
'egyptischen Fundamentalisten'," Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, Oct. 11-12,
1981 and "UniversitUten als N~hrbeden der Revolte," ibid., Nov.
24, 1981; Gabriel Warburg, "The Challenge of Populist Islam in Egypt
and the Sudan in the 1970s" in Wise and Issawi, eds., Middle East
Perspectives, op. cit. For background on the Muslim Brotherhood,
see Christina Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt (The Hague:
Mouton for Hoover, 1964) and Richard Mitchell, The Society of the
Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford, 1969). I have also profited from
Bernard Lewis, "The Return of Islam," Commentary, Jan. 1976; R.
Stephen Humphreys, "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and Syria," Middle East Journal, Winter 1979; R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The
Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and
the Search for Islamic Alternatives," ibid., Winter 1980; Godfrey
Jansen, Militant Islam (London: Pan, 1979); my "The Revival of Islamic
Fundamentalism: The Case of Iran," International Security, Summer
1979; Jean-Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz (their former Cairo correspondent),
"Egypte: le grand defi du rais," Le Monde, Oct. 6, 7, 8, 1981; also
Thomas L. Friedman (from Cairo), "Rise of Military by Moslems Threatens
the Stability of Egypt," The New York Times, Oct. 27, 1981; and
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small, part of it so revolutionary, violence-oriented,and indeed
often terrorist?
What follows, therefore, is an attempt to analyze several
revolutionary, violence-oriented groups of Islamic fundaemntalists
devoted to overthrowing their own Islamic governments: the Egyptian
terrorist groups and the Mojeheddin in Iran. It does not, there-
fore, include Qadhdhafi's Islamic fundameanalism, which like Khumayni's
is in power, the Muslimrebellionin southern Thailand and in Mindanao
against the non-Muslim governments in Manila and Bangkokor the Sunni
fundamentalist terrorism against Asad's Alawite regime in Syria.
I tend to share the view, put forward inter alia by Mohammed
Ayoob, that such an all-embracing "religion plus" as - Islam, despite
its own claim to overshadow them, cannot be studied apart from the
Andreas KohlschUtter from Cairo, "Kann Mubarak den Kurs Kairos
halten?," Die Zeit, Oct. 23, 1981. Fundamentalism is rising throughout
the Tslamic world. See Helena Cobban from Kuweit, "Kuwaiti election
points to new tide of Islamic fundamentalism in region," The Christian
Science Monitor, Mar. 2, 1981; Michel Deure from Tunis, "Le courant
intgriste occupe desormais une place importante dans la vie politique
et sociale," Le Monde, July 14, 1981; and for Pakistan, India,
Malaysia, and Indonesia, Ayoob, The Politics of Islamic Reassertion,
op. cit. and Naipaul, Among the Believers, op. cit.; for Malaysia,
Mohamad Abu Baker, "Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process
in Malaysia, "Asian Survey, Oct. 1981; for Pakistan, William L.
Richter, "The Political Dynamic of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan,"
ibid., June 1979; and for the Philippines, Lela G. Noble, "Muslim
Separatism in the Philippines, 1972-1981: The Making of a Stalemate,"
ibid., Nov. 1981.
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country, culture, and variety in which it occurs. I do not share
what Edward Said has called an "orientalist" view3 6 that the Islamic
revival is by definition a danger to the West; unlike Marx,3 7
I am interested in this part of the essay in understanding, not
changing, it. As Said points out, Marx himself was ambivalent about
imperialism:
Now, sickening as it must be to human
feeling to witness those myriads of industrious
patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations
disorganized and dissolved into their units, thrown
into a sea of woes, and their individual members
losing at the same time their ancient form of
civilization and their hereditary means of subsistence,
we must not forget that these idyllic village communi-
ties, inoffensive though they may appear, had always
been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism,
that they restrained the human mind within the smallest
possible compass, making it the unresisting tool
of superstition, enslaving it beneath the traditional
rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical
energies. . . .
England, it is true in causing a social revolution
in Hindustan was actuated only by the vilest interests,
and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But
that is not the question. The question is, can man-
kind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolu-
tion in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may
have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious
tool of history in bringing about that revolution.3 8
3 6Edward Said, Orientalism (N.Y.: Pantheon, 1978.)
3 7In his eleventh thesis on Feierbpch.
3 8Karl Marx Surveys from Exile, ed. David Fernbach, (London:
Pelican, 1973), pp. 306-307, quoted from Said, Orientalism, op.
cit., p. 153.
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Islam is much more than a religion:- it.is a total way of
life, an all-embracing system of law, politics, economics, culture,
and religion. Thus even the idea of the separation of church and
state is in theory meaningless in Islam, for it originally knew
no such separate concepts as "church" and "state"; and religion,
not language, ethnicity, or state should be central to a Muslim's
life. Moreover, Islam is a courage culture, a religion spread, as
its Prophet urged, by fire and the sword. It was formed and
initially spread by men of the desert, who called for violence in
its cause. Unlike Christianity, it thus has no pacifist elements
in it. Islam is also, like primitive Christianity, theoretically
egalitarian and thus always is grist for radical social reformers.
Islam believes that it represents God's final revelation through the
Prophet and that therefore the Islamic community (umma) is by
definition superior not only to the heathen but also to the "People
of the Book" -- Jews and Christians. Indeed, Islam usually tends
to be unable, and unwilling, to tolerate in a libertarian way the
outside world. Finally, for Islam the imperial intrusions of the
West, and of the state of Israel established with western support, by
the tolerated but despised Jews, were, and remain, constant challenges
to the Prophet's promises and to the Arab's frustrated, furious ex-
imperial pride.
There have been many Islamic fundamantalist revivals in the
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history of Islam, beginning with the (originally terrorist) Kharijites39
in the first century after the Prophet, and going on to the Wahhabi
in the eighteenth, the Senussi in the late nineteenth century,and the
Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan) in the 1930s and since. Nor is the
present revival confined to the Arab world: the Islamic radical leftist
Mojahedin in Iran today hold, as we shall see, views similar to the
violence-oriented Islamic fundamentalist groups in Sa(udi Arabia
and Egypt.
The Islamic fundamentalist revival is transnational and omni-
present, although it has neither one center nor one traditionalist
or charistmatic leader. It has been persistent, despite interruptions,
for at least a century, for it is primarily a revulsion against the
impact of the West. Unlike Japan, the Islamic world has been unable
-- or unwilling -- to create a viable synthesis between traditionalism
and western-style modernity.
Islamic fundamentalism is genuinely religious, but its causes,
and its programs, are also nationalist. Anti-colonial, pan-Arab nationalism
was among its causes. It also provides political and cultural legitimacy,
because it searches for genuine independence and for cultural legitimacy
vis-a-vis the "corrupt" al-Saud dynasty, the theoretically secular
and socialist Balth in Syria and Iraq, and the more or less "Islamic
3 9The Encyclopedia of Islam, new ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1978), vol. 4,
pp. 1074-1077, at p. 1075.
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modernists" in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan. V.S. Naipaul
has put the present Islamic dilemma very well. He is quoting a
high, and very perceptive, Indonesian technocrat and civil servant,
but the analysis applies throughout most of the Islamic world:
. . . there are many people whose bodies have
been abroad but whose minds have stayed in the
country . . . But . . . they don't have the feudal
values of noblesse oblige. So, with their new dignity,
they seek power and wealth, mainly . . . . In their
loss of identity they have lost all values except
. . . power. . . . So you feel adrift. Feeling adrift
is like this. You know you should do good and avoid
the bad. But now you have to think . . . that is
when you start feeling adrift. I am telling you:
it takes a conscious mental and moral effort for someone
like me to do good. Which is wrong . . 40
This leads to a frantic search for authenticity, which becomes,
as Fouad Ajami has put it, "a refuge when practical politics fails
to deliver concrete solution to foreign weakness, to domestic break-
,41
down, to cultural seduction. . . ." In the global context, this
is "the usual nostalgia that lives in every vanished civilization
,42
with a long memory for a vanished whole world." In the Middle East,
it is also a frantic determination to escape from becoming a "Levantine,"
4 0Naipaul, Among the Believers, pp. 358-359.
4 1Ajami, The Arab Predicament, p. 141.
4 2Ibid., p. 177.
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whose attempt to mix the Middle East- and the West, these men feel,
perpetuates, the dilemma which they are determined to exorcise.
Naipaul analyzes how such men become Islamic fundmentalists:
. . . These men were not peasants . . . . They
aspired to high western skills; they took encourage-
ment from, they need, western witness. It was a part
of their great dependence. This dependence pro-
voked.the anguish which (like adolescents) they sought
to assuage in the daily severities of their new religious
practice. . . . The religion which was theirs but
which they had disregarded had now become an area
of particular privacy. It gave an illusion of whole-
ness; it held a promise of imminent triumph. . . .
Islam sanctified rage -- rage about the faith,
political rage: one could be like the other. And
more than once on this journey I had met sensitive 43
men who were ready to contemplate great convulsions.
Khumayni, of course, was in one respect as extreme as the terror-
ist groups, for he wanted, as they did, to overthrow all secular
authority and replace it with a theocratic system of government.
(The Mojahedin, however, also wanted to revolutionize society.)
Yet the dilemma remains, as Naipaul writes of Khumayni:
He required only faith. But he also knew
the value of Iran's oil to countries that lived
by machines, and he could send the Phantoms and
the tanks against the Kurds. Interpreter of God's
will, leader of the faithful, he expressed all the
4 3Naipaul, Among the Believers, pp. 378-379.
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confusion of his people and made it appear
like glory, like the familiar faith: the con-
fusion of a people of high medieval culture
awakening to oil and money, a sense of power
and violation, and a knowledge of a great new
encircling civilization. That civilization couldn't
be mastered. It was to be rejected; at the same
time it was to be depended on. 4 4
So, Naipaul concludes, the revolution will continue:
paradoxically, out of the Islamic re-
vival . . . that appeared to look backward, there
would remain in many Muslim countries, with all
the emotional charge derived from the Prophet's
faith, the idea of modern revolution . . . in-
creasingly now, in Islamic countries, there would
be those who would have a vision of a society
cleansed and purified, a society of believers.
Recent Islamic fundamentalism has been a frequent response
to the interacting crises of the Islamic world, resulting from
the impact of western (and Soviet) imperialism, extremely rapid
economic development, the challenge of Israel, most recently by
the loss of Arab Jerusalem and the West Bank and various secularist
currents, including liberalism and Marxism, of western origin.
All these secularistmovements, Islamic fundamentalists are
convinced, have failed. Moreover, because Islam is the only non-
4 4Ibid., p. 82.
4 5Ibid., pp. 429-430. For an earlier, similar insight, see Arnold
Hottinger, "The Depth of Arab Radicalism," Foreign Affairs, Apr. 1973.
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governmental institution which Islamic authoritarian states cannot
suppress, many of those educated in universities and thus socially
mobilized look to it, and to the fundamentalist Islamic movements,
as the only available possibility, however indirect, to achieve poli-
tical participation.
Most leaders of Islamic fundamentalist groups are middle class
extreme nationalists, usually.of rural, traditionalist backgrounds,
with modern education. But their universities are overcrowded; their
chances of good jobs thereafter, unless they emigrate to the Gulf,
slim; and their living standards low. What they want is more power
and money, "true" independence, and Muslim, not western culture.
Islamic fundamentalism gives them cultural legitimacy and authenti-
city, makes them oppose all Arab regimes and their superpower
associates and become the heirs of Arab anti-colonialism and national-
ism. This combination of power through social revolution, plus return
to the "golden age" of Islam, to be gained by the only possible
way, violence, and thus to overcome one's desperation and existential
Angst, may well be compared, as Arnold Hottinger has, to fascism.
They can hope to get support from the petit bourgeoisie, the urban
proletariat and the lumpenproletariat, whom economic growth and
modernization have touched and tempted but not given equity, demo-
cratization, or cultural authenticity; all of which Islam can be
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interpreted to demand and, ideally, to provide. Therefore many of
them join the university-educated Islamic fundamentalists in striving
to overthrow the Arab political and social order and Arab alliances,
with one or the other superpower.46 These masses are not becoming
more religious -- they always have been. What is happening is that
they are participating more in politics.
The other important responses to the West, secularism and
Islamic modernism, have had varying results. It seems now clear,
however, that except in Turkey, where the new military dictatorship
has renewed Ataturk's repression of the traditionalist Islamic majority,
secularism has failed or, as in Syria, is under severe attack. But
Islamic modernism, not fundamentalism is the predominant current
in the Arab world and is likely to continue to be so, although its
wealthiest area, the Arab oil-producing states, is still, at least
in theory, traditionalist fundamentalist.
One must distinguish between two major versions of Islamic
fundamentalism: traditional and revolutionary. The best examples of
the formerwere Wahhabi Sal~di Arabia and Khumayni's Iran, and of
the latter the three Egyptian and one Iranian violence- and revolu-
tionary-oriented movements which I discuss below. (Qadhdhafi's
Islamic fundamentalist ideology is a modified combination of the
Senussi, Nasir's Arab Socialism, and the Muslim
46I rely here on Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Superpowers in the Arab World,"
The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1981, pp. 94-95 and, for economics
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Brotherhood.) Khumayni is a counterrevolutionary against the Shah's
secularism. His goal is to revive the overriding power of the clergy
(ulam2a.) In contrast, the violence-oriented movements are revolu-
tionary vis-1-vis the regimes now in power in Egypt and Iran. Their
goals are extreme egalitarianism, the destruction of the regimes
(and in the case of one of them, the whole social structure as well),
and of the power and privileges of the )ulama'.
I shall compare the four most important Islamic fundamentalist
movements today: three in Egypt, the Islamic Liberation Organization,48
Repentance and Holy Flight,49 and the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwin), and
the Iranian Mojahedin. All four have three key common characteristics.
The first is their social origin: they come from the middle
and lower-middle strata of the "new middle class": those of rural
background who for the first time have come to the cities. This pro-
duces their second characteristic: psychological alienation arising
and equity, M. Ali Fekrat, "Stress in the Islamic World," Journal
of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Spring 1981.
4 7KUhlein, Die politischen Ideen Mu'ammar al-Qaddafis, op. cit.
4 8Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islam (sometimes also referred to as
Shahab Muhammad-Muhammad's Youth), and called by the Arab mass media
Jam)at al-Fanniyya al-askariyya [Technical Military Academy Group-MA.]
49Jam'at al-Muslimin, known in the Arab media as al-Takfir w al
Hijra [Repentance and Holy Flight-RHF.]
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out of the sudden leaving of a traditional community for the city,
plus the encounter there with foreign cultural influence, agnosticism,
and secularism, all in glaring contrast to traditional Islam. This
shock is the more understandable when one realizes that in the
Middle East, as elsewhere in the third world, the impact of western-
style modernization has been considerable, albeit still partial, only
in the urban intelligentsia, while the rural and urban masses have
remained gripped by an all-pervasive traditionalist Islamic religiosity.
The third factor is a sense of national, social, and economic
deprivation. The Muslim Brotherhood spread most rapidly in the 1940s,
when the impact of the depression of the thirties was increased by
intensified anti-colonialism, caused by theuartime influx of British
troops in Egypt and the rising inflation, all of which most affected
exactly the middle and lower-middle classes from which the Brother-
hood got most of its recruits. Iran in the 1960s and 1970s was much
the same: American crushing of the nationalist movement of Mussadeq,
massive movement from the country to the city, intense inflation,
and massive American presence. Egypt in the 1970s was also similar:
an increasing gap between the wealthy and the middle and lower-middle
classes, caused by Sadat's liberal economic program, high inflation,
relative decline of upward social mobility for the thousands of
university students, and massive foreign presence, first Russian
and then American. Thus, in sum, three perceptions interacted:
national crisis, class crisis, and personal anomie caused by the
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transition from a traditional rural to a partially modern urban
environment (from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft.)
Most of these youthful rebels turned to Islamic fundamentalism
rather than to the-left, to Nasserism or communism, because leftism
was discredited. -They associated it with a foreign power, the
Soviet Union. They believed that it had failed, in Egypt and elsewhere,
as, they thought, the 1967 war had demonstrated. They believed
that it was contrary to Islam. Finally, for them Islamic funda-
mentalism combined rejection of all foreign influences with a recovery
of traditional community, for Islam seems most effectively to ease
the anomie of Muslims of rural origin thrown into urban life.
All these groups have three principal foreign enemies: western,
primarily American, capitalism; Marxist, primarily Soviet, communism;
and "Zionism," i.e. Israel. Israel is always their enemy, and either
the United States or the Soviet Union is the more important other
enemy depending on its perceived presence. They always see Israel
as the ally of one or both of the others.
Finally, these groups share four major commitments: to
replace the present totally corrupt regimes and Muslim clergy
(Oulamal) and in the case of Takfir wall Hijra the societies as well
(which they see as a Jahiliyya like pre-Islamic Arabia) by a pure
Muslim community ()umma), living by the Sharita; to repel all foreign
intruq. as on the Dar al-Islam [the House of Islam]; to aid the
poor and establish equity (al-gistas) and social justice (adala); and
to do all these by violence.
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Let us now look for the immediate causes of the Islamic revival
in Egypt. The main one, as elsewhere in the Arab world, was the
"disaster" (nagba) of the Arabs: their 1967 defeag by Israel. This
defeated not only the Nasserist left but pan-Arabism as well. The
1973 war confirmed this, for it was a victory of states, and primarily
of Egypt, not of the Arab leftist revolutionaries, typified by the
PLO. Yet, ironically, the disasters of 1967 and 1973 also made the
Palestinian cause the least common denominator of the Arab struggle
against Israel. Indeed, the collapse of pan-Arabism left only Islam
and state consciousness, and since the only real state in the
Arab world is Egypt, Islam usually filled the gap.
Moreover, the death of Nisir and the end of his charismatic
appeal, plus OPEC's quadrupling oil prices, had two other results:
the decline of the appeal of Arab nationalism and the distinction and
rise in influence within the Arab and Islamic worlds of the oil-
producing countries -- the victory, so to speak, of the pure, tradi-
tionalist desert men over the corrupt, westernized cities. (But of
course the desert men themselves, in the eyes, for example, of those
who in 1979 stormed the Grand Mosque in Mecca, had become corrupt
and westernized, and were therefore un-Islamic.) The calm of Saldi
Arabia and Sadat's Egypt, after the storm of Nasir, therefore gave
way -- all the more so because they seemed unable to get the U.S.
to solve the Palestinian and Lebanese crises, themselves insults to
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Islam -- to a renewed wave of Islamic fundamentalism.
Westerners saw 1973 as a victory of the Arab world over the
West. But in the Arab world, radicals of the right and left, Islamic,
Nasserite, and communist, saw it quite differently: as the massive
engagement, economic and political, of the conservative oil-producing
Arab states with the West, particularly with the United States, and
with its Arab allies such as Egypt. Thus Arab radicals saw 1973
as not only a victory for Israel but also for the United States and
its "corrupt satellites" Egypt, Sa4udi Arabia, and the Sh7ah's Iran.
Sadat was a more faithful practicing Muslim than Nasir. Indeed,
this plus his initial priority for combatting the leftists and Nasserists
led him to make a serious mistake: to tolerate, and indeed until the
late 1970s somewhat to encourage, the "moderate" Muslim Brotherhood.
But they forgave him neither his previous association with their
arch-enemy Nisirnor his alliance with the United States and his peace
with the "Zionist entity" (Israel.) Only when it was too late, and
when they had infiltrated the army, did he turn on them.
I turn now to the two Egyptian violence-oriented Muslim fundamen-
talist groups: MA and RHF. (While the Muslim Brotherhood has much
the same ideology, it has generally forsworn violence.) The main
difference between the MA and RHF was that MA believed that only
the regime was irretrievably corrupt, while RHF believed that society
was as well and that therefore it must be revolutionized. The MA
members came mostly from lower Egypt, as did their leader; RHF
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members came from Upper Egypt, as did their leader. (Significantly,
he came from Asyut.) B.th leaders were relatively young, had modern
science educations, Muslim Brotherhood background, prison experiences,
disposition to conspiracy, charisma, and a desire for martyrdom.
RHF, which re ortedly played the major role in the assassina-
tion of Sadat and the subsequent riots in Asyut, was more extreme than
MA. Because it rejected society as well as regime, it was determined
to sever itself from it. Many of its members actually went to the
desert to live and train in caves. It had a long-range strategy and
did not intend initially to kidnap and then kill a minister, as it
did in 1977. It recruited through kinship and friendship -- normal
in Arab society. Its members remained largely loyal after Sadat's
police arrested many of them, and their leader was executed, in 1977.
So far I have been analyzing violence-oriented Islamic funda-
mentalism in the Arab world, primarily in Egypt. Islamic fundamenta-
lism in Iran is different from the Sunni world in several important
ways, and since 1979, most importantly, by the victory of theo-
cratic basically counter- revolutionary Islamic fundamentalism.
TwelverShi I Islam has a much more structured religious hierarchy
than Sunni. Modern Persian history has been a prolonged, shifting
struggle, between the monarchy, which profited also from pre-Islamic
Persian traditions and from the declaration in 1501 by Ismail, the
first Savafid Shah, of Shita as the state religion, and the hierarchy
of Islamic jurists (fugaha.) Ismail also declared that through his
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(alleged) descent from the eight Imam, he was entitled to the
regency (niyabat) of the occulted Twelfth Imam. The fugaha thus
had to fight a double battle: against the Shahs and, outside of
Persia, the Sunni rulers, and also against Shi a radical sects.
(Sectarianism was'favored in Shi a by its millenarianism and by its
belief that the Imams could reveal the true (esoteric) meaning (the
ilm) of the Quran and the Hadith.)50 By the nineteenth century
the highest ranking fugaha, the mujtahids, were generally acknowledged
as necessary sources of imitation. They claimed the occulted Imam's
regency but remained out of politics. On the other side, dissident
ulama used philosophy and mysticism to claim for themselves the
right to interpret divine knowledge (ilm) and therefore rejected the
unique right of the fuqaha to do so. They resorted to deception,
an authorized Shit1 tactic against Sunni oppressors, to avoid
personal danger. The struggle between the dissidents and the fugaha
has continued to the present time.
The 1905-1911 Constitutional Revolution was the first major
impact of modernization on Iranian religion and politics and pro-
duced the secularization of social thought and the growth of non-
clerical intellectuals (raushanfikr), non-clerical (but still Muslim)
nationalists, who moved away from the traditionalist Islamic (rather
5 0This sectarianism produced, e.g. the Ismailis and the Nuseiris
(Alawites.)
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than nationalist) fugaha. The two Pahlavi Shahs were extreme examples
of this: they tried both to break the power of the fugaha and to
base Iranian nationalism on pre-Islamic Persian traditions. By the
1960s this led most of the fugaha, led by Khumayni, to ally temporarily
with the dissident Muslim intellectuals against the Pahlavis and
their secularized supporters.Khumayni got the support of the
alienated middle and lower-middle classes as well as the peasantry
and proletariat. He preached cultural as well as political revolution,
including, for the first time in Iranian history, the theocractic
claim that the fugaha were the sole legitimate political as well
as religious rulers of Iran.
The Islamic oppositionists to him may be divided into two
groups: the moderate Islamic nationalists, of whom Mihdi Bazergan,
Khumayni's first prime minister, is a good example, and the radical,
revolutionary Muslims, of whom the major ideologist was the Paris-
educated sociologist, )All Sharilati, who died in 1977, and the
main organization of the guerrilla Mojahedin.
Shariati was one of the major figures in the Iranian revulsion
against tyranny, corruption, and western cultural colonialism
and a search for an Iranian cultural and political identity. (The
other one was Jalal Al-e Ahmad.) He wanted a revolutionary, anti-
theocratic Shi 1 Islam. Like many of the previous Shiri philosophers
and mystics, he rejected the claim of the fugaha to authority and
legitimacy, religious and political. For him Shi 1 millenarianism
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was a revolutionary "Islamic Protestantism," carried out by intellectuals
(raushanfikr), not the reactionary )uiang), to produce a just, class-
less society with a dictatorship of the minority of Islamic revolu-
tionary intellectuals over the reactionary masses. He demanded
that the westernization of Iranian culture be overcome in order to
regain true Iranian independence, as a part of the global third world
anti-imperalist movement, including such secular intellectuals as
Cesaire and Fanon -- thus once again, as Ajami has pointed out, showing
that Islamic revolutionary socialism in fact reflects much of the
very West which it claims to reject.51
Shariati's appeal to educated Iranian youth of bazaari and
lower-class origin was immense, for he explained and refuted western
ideologies -- just what they were looking for. His influence was
particularly great among the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the principal Moslem
terrorist guerrilla organization. (The other one, the Feda'eyan-e Khalq,
was secular and Marxist.) The former grew up among children of
bazaaris and m in the radical youth wing of the (Islamic)
National Front (just like the Egyptian Islamic terrorist groups); the
latter among the radical children of the modernized elite and workers
5 1The above is largely based on two chapters by Prof. Mangol Bayat
of Harvard, to whom I am most grateful for many discussions on this
subject: "Islam in Pahlavi and Post-Pahlavi Iran: A Cultural
Revolution?," in John L. Esposito, ed., Islam and Development:
Religion and Sociopolitical Change (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Univ.,
1980), pp. 87-106 and "Shi'ism in Contemporary Iranian Politics:
The Case of Ali Shari'ati" in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim, eds.,
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in the Tudeh. Both arose out of frustration vis-a-vis the Shah's
ruthless repression. Both groups split before the revolution;
both played active roles in it. (The split in the Mojahedin was
between Marxists and non-Marxists; as Nasirhad shown, Islam and socialism
have in common collectivism, anti-westernism, and egalitarianism.
KhumaynT thereafter suppressed first the Feda'iyan and then the Mojahedin
because of their competition with the )ulama) and their demands
for a social revolution. The Fedaiyan declined in power, especially
because the majority group cooperated with the religious fanatics, but
the Mojahedin became the principal challenge to Khumayni and were
close to Bani-Sadr. In 1980 and 1981 they engaged in a bloody wave of
assassinations of Khumayni's associates and he of them. Thus KhumaynI
predictably reverted to the historic struggle of the fugaha with
the dissidents, while the mohajedin carried an a bloody guerrilla
struggle with him, reportedly including a partial, pragmatic alliance
with the moderate Islamic reformers. The result, at the beginning
of 1982, remains like all other aspects of Iran, in doubt.5 2
What can one say of the future of Islamic fundamentalism, in
Egypt and elsewhere in the Islamic world? It will rise or fall
Towards a Modern Iran (London: Frank Cass, 1980), pp. 155-168. I
am very grateful to Prof. Bayat for many discussions on Iran. I
have also profited from Yann Richard, "Contemporary Shi i Thought,"
in Keddie, Roots of Revolution, op. cit., pp. 202-228 and Bill, "The
Politics of Extremism in Iran," Current History, Jan. 1982.
5 2This paragraph is based primarily on Shahram Chubin, "Leftist
Forces in Iran," Problems of Communism, July-Aug. 1980.
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according to the regimes' effectiveness in meeting the social,
economic, and national grievances to which it responds, and to what
happens in Islamic fundamentalist Iran.
But it is unlikely to succeed permanently anywhere. Like
anarchism, it is more destructive than constructive. It is also, to
use Durkheim's distinction, a sect rather than a denomination, and
fanatical sects have always evolved into less fanatical denominations,
because Weber's "ethic of reponsibility" wins out, in those who
want to run a state and society, over his "ethic of absolute ends."
Egypt, above all other Arab states, is too modernized to accept in-
definitely, or probably even to allow to come to power, the Islamic
fundamentalists. Terrorist religious mania is one way to try to
escape the age of anxiety, what Weber called the "ice age of bureau-
cracy." But it rarely wins at all, and has never won for long. The
Muslim world seems condemned, like the rest of the third world, to
be trapped between its religion and traditions and an unachievable
western-styled modernity. But then, so is the West itself.
In this respect, I think, Ajami, rightly criticizes Naipaul,
and expands, worsens, and thus correctly poses the problem:
. . . Were Naipaul to mediate on place less
haunted for him by old ghosts, he might come to
realize some of the truths that Conrad learned;
that darkness is not only there but here as well; that
all men and societies are haunted by their own demons;
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that all of us are denieda clear vision of
the world. 53
53In his review of Naipaul's Among the Believers in The New York
Times Book Review, Oct. 25, 1981, p. 32.
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III
United States Policy in the Middle East: The Palestinian Issue5 4
The basic American national interests in the Middle East
are, first, to avoid, or at least to postpone, another Arab-Israeli
war, because it would probably mean another oil boycott and pro-
duction limitation, another opportunity for the Soviet Union, and
more tension with U.S. allies in Western Europe and Japan.
Second, to contain, and if possible to reverse, Soviet
influence in the region. Given Soviet ambitions there and the
unlikelihood of Soviet support for an effective guarantee of Israel's
security, Moscow is unlikely to want or to help to bring about a
settlement. The United States therefore has no interest in Soviet
participation in the peace process.
Third, to preserve secure western and Japanese access, at
bearable prices, to Middle Eastern oil. This may now seem less
54
For three varying recent views on this issue, see Robert G. Neumann,
"Toward a Reagan Middle East Policy?," Orbis, Fall 1981 and Harvey
Sicherman, "The United States and Israel: A Strategic Divide?,"
ibid., Summer 1980; and Joseph N. Greene et al., The Path to Peace
(Mt. Kisco, N.Y.: Seven Springs Center, Oct. 1981.)
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pressing, for there is an oil glut, but if the western recession
were to end or Sa(udi oil production to be seriously cut, the glut
would soon disappear. Such access requires stability and pro-
western policies in the conservative Arab oil-producing states.
Progress toward the solution of the Palestinian problem will not
alone ensure these, for the sources of Arab radicalism are too deep,
but it will help, and lack of it will speed up the danger. A
Palestinian solution would be another insurance policy for the United
States against a much worse energy crisis.
For all these reasons, plus the collapse of American influence
in Iran, the United States has been trying to improve its relations
with Sai~dfArabia, to establish, if not bases, then stand-by mili-
tary facilities there, primarily for the deployment of the planned
Rapid Deployment Force, and to arm and train the SatildT armed forces.
5 5
(The same reasoning has led to American plans for military facilities
in Oman, Somalia, Kenya, and at Ras Banas on the Red Sea coast of
Egypt.)
This policy led to the U.S. AWACS sale to Riyadh. Israel,
predictably, feared and strongly opposed the U.S. rapprochement with
Saiigdr Arabia. Jerusalem had already been confronted with Washing-
ton's increasing treatment of Egypt as nearly an equal of Israel.
5 5See the long article by Scott Anthony on U.S. construction of RDF
facilities in Sa(Tidl Arabia in The Washington Post, Nov. 1, 1981
and John Kifner from Beirut in The New York Times, Nov. 1, 1981.
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That Washington should do the same with Satudi Arabia, which had
not made peace with Israel and supported the PLO, seemed to the great
majority of Israelis outrageous.
Fourth, the United States should continue to guarantee the
independence and security of Israel. This is morally necessary
because of the tragedy of the Jewish people in our time, the long,
solemn American commitment to it, Israel's western democratic polity,
and the psychological wounds that Israelis destruction would inflict
ndtz only on Jewish Americans but on the whole American body politic.
It is strategically necessary because of Israel's key geographic
location, its proven military strength and valor, and its safely
anti-Soviet policy.
But American toleration and financing of Begin's creeping
annexationism, at the cost of c. $2 billion per year, is contrary
to the American tradition of opposition to colonialism and support
of self-determination. (It is also a betrayal of the noblest ideals
of Zionism.) It is a strategic liability because it plays into the
hands of the Soviet Union and Arab radicalism and thus promotes
conflict and endangers energy security. Indeed, the United States
stands globally almost alone in its toleration of Begin's annexa-
tionist policies.
From the perspectives of American ideals and national interests,
therefore, Begin's policies are morally indefensible and strategically
disastrous. Begin's Israel is a strategic liability to the United
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States, not an asset.
Why does the United States continue to subsidize Begin to sabotage
American policy? There is widespread U.S. public support for Israel,
intensified by pro-Israeli fundamentalist Christians and by Ameri-
can admiration for Israel's democracy and military feats, plus
widespread American popular resentment against "the Arabs raising
the price of oil" (although Venezuela and the Sliih started it.)
There are deep, genuine differences in American public opinion on
Middle Eastern issues. Finally, and most important, the pro-Israeli
lobby in Washington is extremely effective. Jewish Americans,
although only some six and one-half million, are superbly organized.
They vote far more frequentlythan other Americans. More prosperous
than the national average, they put their money where their mouth
is, in campaign contributions to candidates who pledge to support
Israeli policies. They have overwhelmingly supported Israel since
the Holocaust and the foundation of the state of Israel. And although
many of them now oppose Begin's policies, few say so publicly and their
organizations generally still support them.
A successful American Middle Eastern policy also requires
effective global containment of the Soviet Union, a global nuclear,
conventional, and naval build-up and the reestablishment of a re-
gional Middle Eastern military balance to overcome the effects
of the recent Soviet strategic gains on its periphery -- notably
its air bases in southwestern Afghanistan, which can give fighter cover
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to bombers over the Straits of Hormuz. This now is under way
through defense build-up of the Navy and of facilities in the region,
56
aid to Pakistan, and, reportedly, arms aid to the Afghan rebels.
The U.S. has cut back oil imports substantially and is in-
creasing its strategic oil reserve. It needs to cut back imports
and to encourage oil substitutes more than it has.
But above all, Washington should give priority to preventing
another Middle Eastern war and an oil boycott and production
limitation. These aims, and, indeed Israel's own long-range
security interests, require that the Palestinian issue be gradually
and finally resolved.
The U.S. should certainly counter Soviet activities in the
Middle East. But there as elsewhere Moscow exploits, but rarely
creates, the opportunities which arise from local and regional
tensions. The best way to lower Soviet influence, therefore, is
to forestall or contain these opportunities. Since the Palestinian
issue is Moscow's greatest Middle Eastern opportunity, its settlement
is essential to contain Soviet influence there.
The time has finally come for Americans to distinguish between
support for Israel's security and independence and support for Begin's
annexationism. The organized American Jewish community should
5 6A case for U.S. aid to Pakistan , which, however, does not
discuss the nuclear non-proliferation dimension, may be found in
Rodney W. Jones, "Mending Relations with Pakistan," The Washington
Quarterly, Spring 1981.
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consider whether it is prudent to support Begin's policies so
completely. President Reagan's recent comment, clearly directed
at Begin, that the United States cannot accept foreign inter-
ference in its policies, was followed by former Presidents Carter
and Ford declaring, on their way back from Sadat's funeral, that
the United States should negotiate with the PLO as soon as the
latter recognizes Israel's right to eixst. 5 7
Washington should make clear, as former Presidents Ford and
Carter have advocated, that it will deal with the PLO as the repre-
sentative of the greatmajority of Palestinians if and when the PLO
simultaneously recognizes the right of Israel to exist within its
1967 boundaries and accepts international and American guarantees
of Israel's security. Washington should explore privately and more
vigorously whether the PLO will accept this condition. Second,
Washington should make clear to Begin, first privately and then
publicly, that the U.S. will compel Israel to evacuate all the
occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, within
the context of such a comprehensive peace settlement. This process
would begin by Washington withholding an amount of economic aid
equivalent to the cost of Israeli West Bank settlements. If this
had no effect, Washington would begin to reduce military aid. It
5 7 The New York Times, Oct. 12, 1981.
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should simultaneously reiterate to the Arab governments and to the
Soviet Union that it will continue to guarantee Israel's independence
and security, within the 1967 boundaries, by all means necessary,
including military force.
Israel gives two justifications for not returning to the
1967 boundaries: security and, for Begin and the religious parties,
Israel's religious and historic right to the West Bank. With
respect to the former, the United Stateshas no reason necessarily
to accept Israel's definition of its own security. Not to return
to the 1967 boundaries guarnatees an indefinite succession of wars,
to great American disadvantage. The Arabs will not, and need not,
accept anything less. Almost the whole world, including America's
allies, agrees with them on this point. A Sinai-type peace-keeping
force would be more valuable to prevent a war than Israeli posts
along the Jordan. Israel wants to have full American support and
continue to be able to carry out preemptive raids as it wishes. A
comprehensive settlement would have to prevent both Israelis and Arabs
from such actions.
With respect to the second, U.S. traditions and national
interests, in my view, preclude agreement with Israel's claim to
the West Bank. The same is true for East Jerusalem, which contains
the shrines not only of Judaism and Islam but also of Christianity.
The 1947 United Nations Palestinian partition resolution provided
for its internationalization. Thus there is no reason for American foreign
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policy to support unilateral Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem,
at the price, which would have to be paid, of never reaching a
comprehensive settlement.
Finally, one may argue that the number and population of the
Israeli settlements within the West Bank and the post-1967 extended
boundaries of Jerusalem are so great that their evacuation is no
longer practical. It has certainly become more difficult, and
it would even now be possible for an Israeli government to under-
take only if it were under extreme pressure. Yet, again, should
this weigh more heavily in U.S. calculations than having a compre-
hensive settlement? I think not.
Washington should make clear that it would compel Israel to
leave the occupied territories only if and when the Arab states
involved, (Jordan, Syria, and the Lebanon) signed peace treaties
with Israel and accepted the extension of the Sinai peace-keeping
force, including its American component, all along the Israeli border.
Jordan might well agree to this before Syria, so Israel should not
be compelled to evacuate the Golan Heights until Damascus agreed.
East Jerusalem should after the settlement be under Arab, not
Israeli sovereignty, for no lasting peace is possible if it remains
so, but the peace-keeping force should also patrol the border between
Israeli and Arab Jerusalem, and the settlement should guarantee free
movement within the city and free access for all to the holy places
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of all three religions. The peace settlement should also include
an explicit recognition by the PLO of Israel's independence and
security within the 1967 boundaries.
The form of government thereafter in the West Bank, Gaza, and
East Jerusalem should be determined by the Arab states bordering
on Israel and Sa iudT Arabia, plus the PLO, and the peace settlement
should require that it be ratified by a referendum of the inhabitants
of these territories. This is an Arab matter and should be left by
the United States and Israel for the Arabs to decide. They will
very probably agree on a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza,
and East Jerusalem. However, such a state would be dependent on
Saiudr subsidies and militarily greatly inferior to Israel and/or
Jordan. The danger of it becoming, as most Israelis fear, "a Soviet
base" is so small that it can be dismissed as compared to the gains
for the U.S. of a settlement.
We must have no illusions: the Arabs will only refrain in the
future from attacking Israel as long as they remain certain, as
most of them have been since the 1973 war, that the United States
will prevent its destruction. (No one else will, and Israel alone
no longer can.) Israel's fear of destruction is genuine. But given
the spiralling cost of weapons systems and the Arabs' ability to
buy them, Israel can survive only if it continues to get massive
American arms and budgetary aid. Its long-range security can
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be guaranteed only if the Palestinian issue is solved and if
American troops help guarantee the security of its 1967 boundaries.
True, this will restrain Israel as well as the Arabs from preemptive
strikes against each other. But nothing less will preserve peace.
The danger to the U.S. of war and Soviet expansionism, and the
threat to its energy supplies are so great that the U.S. should take
what risk is involved. As the U.S. troop presence in West Berlin
and South Korea has demonstrated, the danger of war is much less when
U.S. troop presence guarantees peace.
Such a comprehensive peace settlement will require that the
President announce it publicly, with his reasons for it, and get
Congressional support for it; that American pressure to attain
it be credible; that American assistance to the moderate Arab
states, notably Egypt and Sa udT Arabia, and to the Afghan rebels
continue; and that American military facilities and the Rapid
Deployment Force continue to be built up.
It is all too easy to lean back and console oneself with the
biblical adage that "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof,"
and to hold on to the unrealistic belief that the Arabs can be
brought to cooperate with the United States and Israel against the
Soviet Union. Democracies often wait until it is too late to tend
to their vital interests, for their leaders usually bow to domestic
pressures and thus often feel compelled to neglect the national
inLerest.
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I have no illusions that the U.S. policy I propose above is
at present possible, given-American domestic politics. In 1957
Eisenhower compelled Israel to withdraw from Sinai. shortly after
Israel had occupied it. He moved quietly and decisively, and his
triumphal reelection just before had made his domestic position
unassailable. But Ben Gurion was not Begin., much more time
has passed since Israel's conquest of the West Bank in 1967,
-- East Jerusalem means much more to Israelis than does Sinai, and
Reagan is not Eisenhower.
Nevertheless, editorial opinion58 and Congressional action in
the United States is beginning to change, as the AWACS victory in
the Senate recently showed. It is therefore high time to expand
full and frank American public discussion of all these issues.
Only the understanding of them by the American public can give a
President the popular support that he will need to carry out such
a policy. And only if he does so can American national interests
in the Middle East and the interests of moderate Israelis and Arabs
alike, be preserved. The longer that he does not, the more America's
interests will suffer, and so will those of Israel and of the Arabs.
Only Moscow will gain.
5 8A recent striking example of this was Strobe Talbott, "What to do
about Israel," Time, Sept. 7, 1981.
